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Stratified juror selection:
cross-section by design
By manipulatingthe number of citizens summoned, qualified, or sent questionnaires
on each of several multiple lists, a court can ensure racialand ethnic diversity on
venires. However the legality of this procedure remains unclear

by Nancy J. King and G. Thomas Munsterman
Americans claimed Afri-

A

can, Asian, Latino, or Nasof 1990,
one of every
four
tive
American
ancestry.
Only 30 years earlier, approximately 90
percent of Americans were white, and
most of the remaining 10 percent were
African American.' In most courtrooms around the country the composition of juries has not kept pace with
this rapid change in demographics,
1. See Ramirez, MulticulturalEmpowerment: it's
Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REv.
957, 991-1 (1995). The projections for 1995 include even lower percentages of "non-Hispanic"
whites. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract
of the United States 13, Table 12 (1994).

despite efforts by courts and lawmakers to eliminate discriminatory selection procedures.
Of the various selection methods
that contribute to the underrepresentation of members of racial and ethnic
minority groups on juries, peremptory
challenges have attracted the most attention in recent years. Yet gains in diversity from regulating, or even eliminating, peremptory challenges are
necessarily limited by the composition
of the venire from which jurors are
chosen. This article describes methods
of constructing lists of veniremembers
and qualified jurors used by some
March-April 1996

courts to restore the racial and ethnic
diversity that is missing from the primary source lists or is eroded in the
process of summoning and qualification. It also evaluates potential legal
challenges to these techniques.
NANCY J. KING is a professor of law at
Vanderbilt University.
G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN is director of
the Center for Jury Studies, National Center for State Courts.

Inability to secure racial and ethnic
diversity on lists of qualified jurors remains the most intractable problem in
Volume 79, Number 5 Judicature 273

jury administration today. Legal challenges to the composition of lists of
qualified jurors and veniremembers
continue to cause what one prosecutor
termed a "huge strain" on the courts.
A list of qualified jurors can take
months to compile and usually serves a
court as the sole source of grand jurors
and trial jurors for a year, or even several years. A single defendant's attack
on the composition of a qualified list
may therefore require the
reprosecution of other defendants indicted or convicted by
juries drawn from the same
tainted list, and delay further
jury proceedings while a new
list is created.
Even when selection systems
pass constitutional and statutory standards, legally selected
venires that fail to reflect the
diversity of the community can
carry serious costs. The resulting underrepresentation of minority residents on juries means
that minority citizens receive
less exposure to the educational experience of jury service, fuels the decline of public
trust in jury fairness, and raises
the risk that some jury decisions may
be mis- or under-informed, lacking the
breadth of experience that diverse
panels can provide.2
Hoping to minimize these risks,
state and federal judges and administrators have invested considerable resources adjusting their selection procedures so that they are more likely to
produce panels that reflect the racial
and ethnic composition of the surrounding community. Supplementing
or replacing voter lists with more inclusive lists, updating addresses, implementing follow-up procedures for
those who do not respond to jury summonses, reducing the economic hardship ofjury service by increasing juror
compensation, providing child care,
and limiting the term of jury service
are steps that can help.3 These reforms,

however, often fall short of producing
qualified lists and venires that mirror
local demographics. Members of some
racial and ethnic minorities may be statistically less likely to receive their questionnaires and summonses because
they move more frequently,4 are more
274
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one method of restoring to venires the
racial or ethnic diversity that is sometimes missing from original source lists
or that is reduced during the process
of qualification and summoning. By
manipulating the number of citizens
in each of several multiple smaller lists
who are summoned, qualified, or sent
questionnaires, a court can ensure

that each of several populations is
sampled proportionally, and can target for oversampling those populations that continue to yield disproportionately fewer veniremembers.
Potential jurors can be grouped according to whatever demographic
characteristics are available to jury administrators, including residence,
ethnicity, or race.
For example, assume that a master
list for a particular jury district is
composed of names of registered
voters from counties X, Y, and Z,
each containing equal numbers
of adult citizens. If the voter registration rate is lower in county X
than in counties Yand Z, and the
names of persons who will receive qualifying questionnaires
are selected randomly from a
combined list, the proportion of
questionnaires that are sent to
county X will be smaller than
that county's share of the entire
district's adult population. A
court can ensure that the proportion of questionnaires sent to
each county always equals that
county's share of the district's
adult population by dividing the
district's jury list into counties and selecting the county's proportionate
share of questionnaire recipients randomly from each separate list.'
When racial or ethnic groups are
distributed unevenly among the counties, ensuring residential proportionality at each step or in every mailing can
help ensure racial or ethnic propor-

2. See, e.g., King, RacialJuiymandering: Cancer or
Cure? A Contemporay Review of Affirmative Action in
Juiy Selection, 68 N.Y.U L. REV. 707 (1993).
3. Munsterman and Munsterman, The Searchfor
Representativeness, I IJusT. Svs.J. 59 (1986).
4. See, e.g., SJCs Final Report On Racial and Ethnic
Bias, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, Oct. 3, 1994,
at 11 (reporting that state commission found that
underrepresentation on state juries is primarily
due to outdated address lists and the low response
rate of minority residents summoned for jury
duty.")
5. See, e.g., Hardin v. City of Gadsden, 837 F.
Supp. 1113, 1116 (N.D. Ala. 1993) ("given the extent of poverty and lack of vehicles among blacks in
the Northern District generally, the use of a district-wide jury wheel disproportionately denies
them the opportunity to serve on juries outside
their divisions" noting that about one quarter of
black households had no access to a car, compared
to 6 percent of white households, and that although the qualified wheel had almost 15 percent
blacks, the percentage of blacks that appeared in
venires was only 5-10 percent).
Lee, "Minority Issues injury Manage6. See, e.g.,
ment" 11 (September 1991) (noting that while

only 3 percent of white residents of New Jersey in
1980 were non-citizens, 50 percent of Asian-Pacific
Islanders were non-citizens, as well as 23 percent of
those listed by the 1980 census as "Spanish Origin") (manuscript available from the Center for
Jury Studies of the National Center for State
Courts).
7. Id. at 13 (noting study finding that almost one
in four black men in their twenties is either serving
time or on probation or parole on any given day
compared to 15 percent for white males and 10
percent for Hispanic males).
8. Cf. Cerrone v. Colorado, 1995 Colo. LEXIS
300, affirming 867 P.2d 143 (Colo. App. 1994) (describing state grand jury selected by mailing 75
qualifying questionnaires to each of five counties);
United States v. McKinney, 53 F.3d 664 (5th Cir.
1995) (describing plan that requires questionnaires be sent to a randomly selected number of
names "weighted by county population"); Hardin,
837 F. Supp. at 1117 (noting that the names of persons sent questionnaires when filling the district's
qualified jury wheel are selected by computer to
"include persons from each county within the district proportionate to the percentage of voters
from those counties in the masterjury wheel").

likely to find it impossible to travel to
the courthouse due to distance or
cost,' and are more likely to be disqualified for jury service because they
speak a language other than English,
are not United States citizens,6 or possess disqualifying criminal histories.7
Stratified selection
Stratified selection, also known as
structured or clustered sampling, is
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tionality as well. In the example above, those previously used in Maryland and
if county X contained a higher per- Delaware, were designed to follow recentage of Latino residents than the quirements allocating seats on the
other counties, stratifying the ques- grandjury proportionately by political
tionnaire mailing by county will en- subdivision. The courts in Wayne
sure that the share of questionnaires County, Michigan once composed
sent to persons from county X never venires using units called "jurats,"
falls below X's share of the entire each of which consisted of a specific
number of names from each district
district's population.
Obviously, this example of stratified within the county."
selection has a relatively modest
goal. It assures only that the
number of potential jurors in
each county sent questionnaires
corresponds to that county's
share of the district adult population. It does not guarantee that
residents will receive or return
those questionnaires, meet the
qualifications for jury service, or
be summoned for service in proportion to the county's share of
the district's population. Seeking more effective controls,
some jurisdictions have adopted
or considered more ambitious
stratification plans.
One alternative is to amend
jury selection procedures so that
additional qualification quesEngineering jury lists to mirror
tionnaires and summons are sent to
persons in certain counties, districts, residential demographics is not a
or zip codes based on response rates to particularly novel idea. Residential
prior mailings. Studies have shown, for proportionality on the master lists
instance, that questionnaires sent into from which qualified jurors are sesome zip codes in New York that con- lected has been required by statute
tain predominantly minority residents in every federal court since 1968 and
are completed and returned at a lower is also mandated in several states.
rate than questionnaires sent to zip What is unique about the stratified
codes containing proportionately selection systems discussed above is
fewer minority residents.9 Such varia- that they seek proportional representions in response rates could form the tation by geography at later stages of
basis for the determination of the the jury selection process, not just on
number of extra names to be drawn original source lists or master wheels.
Another departure is the focus on
from specific sub-jurisdiction areas.
Some stratified systems, such as the representation of residential ar9. THEJURY PROJECT, REPORT TO THE CHIEFJUDGE OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, March 31, 1994, at 15-17
(finding that the proportion of questionnaires designated by the post office as "non-deliverable" is
often higher for areas that contain predominantly
minority residents than it is for less diverse areas).
10. Allocation proved imprecise and subject to
challenge. All three systems were eventually replaced by county-wide random selection.
11. Another difference is that federal law requires only that the master list mirror the geographic proportions of actual or registeredvoters, not
all adult residents. The proportion of minorities
that vote or register is well below the proportion of
whites that vote in most jurisdictions. For a detailed description, see United States v. Bailey, 862
F. Supp. 277 (D. Colo. 1994).

12. This has been the practice in some jurisdictions in California and New York. See The Jury
Project, supra n. 9, at 18 (noting that one New York
jury commissioner has for several years sent more
questionnaires into minority neighborhoods "to
compensate for the relatively low numbers of minority jurors she sees.")
13. United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut, "Modification to the Second Restated Plan for Random Selection of Grand and
PetitJurors Pursuant Tojury Selection And Service
Act of 1968 (As Amended)."
14. Georgia Uniform Superior Court Rule 34
(1980); Administrative Office of the Courts, Judicial Council of Georgia, Jury Commissioner's
Handbook 19-22 (1992) (explaining Unified App.
Rule 34.3)).
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eas that are quite small-such as zip
codes, census tracts, or local city
council or alderman precincts-as
compared to the larger units typically represented in master lists, such
as counties or municipalities."
Another stratified selection method
is the direct use of race or ethnicity to
target or define groups of potential jurors to sample. Instead of preserving
geographic proportionality on
qualified lists or venires, and in
the process restoring racial proportionality, these systems seek
race or ethnic proportionality
directly. For example, in an attempt to improve the representativeness of venires, some
courts have instituted "informal" procedures whereby areas
of known minority populations
receive more questionnaires. 2
An ethnic-conscious plan was
recently adopted in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut, a court that has
weathered recent successful
challenges based upon the
underrepresentation of Hispanics in its qualified lists and
venires.Judges there modified the jury
selection plan to provide that "additional" questionnaires, the number to
be based on the rate of response,
would be sent to "those municipalities... whose Hispanic population
is equal to or greater than ten percent
of its total population." The change
was adopted "to further enhance the
policy of the Jury Selection Plan.. .with
respect to the participation of Hispanics in federal juries.""
In the Eastern District of Michigan a
system of post-qualification balancing
is used. The court there randomly
strikes from the list of persons qualified the specific number of "white and
other" potential jurors needed to obtain a qualified list with racial demographics identical to that of the population. Jury commissioners in Georgia,
under supreme court guidance, must
"balance the box" of the names of
qualified jurors to correspond to the
race and gender proportions of the
county. 1 4 Names of persons to be summoned are selected from this balanced
box or list. Other courts have approved supplemental summonses of
Volume 79, Number 5 Judicature 275

qualified minority citizens to ensure
15
proportional venires.
Implementation
Jurisdictions considering these and
other stratified selection techniques
should be sure to research the causes
of underrepresentation with careful
statistical analysis. This can help reformers identify those specific stages
of the selection process that have
the most disproportionate effects, and can sometimes uncover problems in a selection system that, when fixed, go a long
way to achieving proportionate
representation. One federal
court, for example, discovered
that its computer passed over for
selection any resident of a city
ending in the letter "d" because
it was programmed to conclude
that the "d" meant that the juror
had died. Another county court
learned that its system had been
pulling most of the potential jurors from the biggest city into
one particular court of limited
jurisdiction, leaving very few urban minority residents for general jurisdiction courts.
Statistical analysis can also minimize
the risk that proposed modifications
will produce unexpected results. For
instance, efforts to send extra questionnaires into a particular community
that contains more minority citizens
than other communities in the jury
district may backfire, skewing the racial composition of a qualified list even
further, if the number of additional
minority responders is dwarfed by the
increased numbers of white responders from the oversampled district.
Court computer systems may also require some updating to accommodate
the manipulation of combined lists or
a list with multiple variables, although
the most popular software systems now
in place for jury selection can handle
stratified selection.
The most frequent concern voiced
about stratified selection, however, is
not how to get it to work well, but
whether it is legal. Without the assurance that proposed modifications
comply with the law, a court that
adopts stratified selection to combat
underrepresentation in its existing sys-

tem may risk trading one set of costly
legal challenges for another. So far
very few published judicial opinions
have considered whether any of these
various forms of stratified selection
comply with federal or state law.

tion rights of potential jurors under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Constitution. When a jurisdiction uses stratified selection to create
its qualified lists and venires, citizens
may be summoned at different rates,
depending on their residence, race,
ethnicity, or other criteria employed by
the selection system. Summoning a
person slightly more often based only
upon where he or she lives would probably pass equal protection review because of the legitimate governmental
interest in securing a cross-section of
the community on jury venires. However, the constitutionality of balancing

lists by race or ethnicity, sometimes
termed affirmative action injury selection, has recently become the subject
of considerable academic debate.
It is not at all clear who would be allowed to challenge the constitutionality of a selection system that considers
race or ethnicity in constructing lists of
qualified jurors lists or veniremembers. Potential jurors who may be summoned less frequently because
of the system's use of race or
ethnicity may claim that they
have been denied equal opportunity to serve as jurors. 16 However, few who escape jury service have an incentive to sue.
The more likely challenger of a
jury selection system is the
criminal defendant who seeks
relief from a jury's indictment
or guilty verdict.
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court provide two plausible, but so far untested, theories by which a defendant could
seek relief from the decisions of
juries chosen from venires constructed with racially stratified
jury lists. A defendant may allege a violation of his or her
own right to equal protection, if he or
she shares the race of those whose opportunities for jury service are reduced under the stratified system. Alternatively, a defendant could assert
third-party standing to raise the rights
of potential jurors, even if he or she
does not share their race or ethnicity.
The Court has allowed defendants to
challenge discrimination against potential jurors during voir dire under
this theory, 7 but has not addressed the
propriety of allowing defendants to
challenge violations of the rights of potential jurors that may occur earlier in
the selection process."5

15. See, e.g. St. Cloud v. Leapley, 521 N.W.2d 118
(S.D. 1994) (reminding trial judges to add supplemental names of minorities to venire to correct
grossly underrepresentative venires).
16. A decision of the Supreme Court this past
term limiting the standing of those seeking to challenge race-conscious electoral districting practices
may curtail the pool of plaintiffs who could raise
this claim. In United States v. Hayes, 115 S. Ct.
2431 (1995), the Court concluded that only those
persons who reside within a racially-gerrymandered
district have suffered an injury sufficient to maintain an equal protection challenge to the use of
race in selecting the district's boundaries. Hays
suggests that only those citizens eligible for jury

service whose chances for inclusion on the qualified list could have been affected by the stratified
system would have standing to bring a constitutional challenge.
17. SeePowers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
18. Some lower courts have. Compare State v.
Moore, 404 S.E. 2d 845, 846 (N.C. 1991) (granting
relief to African American defendant who objected
to replacement of white grand jury foreman with
African American grand jury foreman); and
Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1228 & n.8 (3d
Cir. 1992) (upholding judges attempt to secure racial balance on grand jury, but noting defendant
had standing to argue that thejudge's practice violated the rights of potential jurors), cert. denied, 113

Equal protection challenges
One potential challenge to stratified
selection is based on the equal protec-
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Even assuming that someone passed
over for service, or a defendant, has
standing to object to the consideration
of race or ethnicity in "balancing" juror lists, there is little agreement about
what standard of review a court should
use to evaluate the constitutionality of
such a scheme. Professor Albert
Alschuler has argued that because the
use of race to secure proportional
representation of minority racial
groups on juries does not stigmatize or disadvantage people on
the basis of their race, it should
withstand a challenge under the
Equal Protection Clause. 9 Others
have predicted that such techniques would be upheld only if a
reviewing court was persuaded
that the use of race or ethnicity
was necessary to advance a compelling governmental interest.2"
Two 1995 decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court also suggest strict
scrutiny would be applied to racebased selection procedures. In
Adarand Constructors,Inc., v. Pena,
addressing the constitutionality
of a minority preference for federal contracts, the Court emphasized that all race-based classifications
are presumptively invalid unless narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
interest. 2 ' In Miller v. Johnson, the
Court revealed little interest in relaxS. Ct. 2433 (1993) and Ranseur, 983 F.2d at 1251
(Cowen, J., dissenting) (finding defendant had
standing to raise and succeed on claim that grand
jurors' equal protection rights had been violated
by judge's effort to seat racially balanced grand
jury) with Ranseur,983 F.2d at 1245 (Alito,J. concurring) (concluding that defendant had no standing to raise rights of grand jurors or potential
grand jurors). See also Meders v. State, 389 S.E.2d
320, 323 (Ga. 1990) (finding defendant failed to
preserve his challenge to Georgia's stratified system, bnt expressing disapproval of "manipulating" the selection system); Meders, 389 S.E.2d at
326 (Bentham, J., concurring) (finding Georgia's
selection system constitutional); Acadiana Bureau,
Appeal court orders hearing on race issue, The Advocate (Baton Rouge), March 9, 1995, at 3B (reporting case in which appellate court held white defendant had standing to raise the rights of minority
residents excluded because of their race from service as grand jury foremen).
19. See Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44
DuKF L.J. 704 (1995).
20. See, e.g., King, supra n. 2.
21. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
22. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
Previously, in 1993, the Court agreed that voters
may bring a claim tinder the Equal Protection
Clause when the boundaries of their electoral district were designed to enhance the proportion of
minority voters in the district. In Miller, the Court
explained that such a claim should succeed with
proof that "the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles" to racial

tion may now be the only situation in
which the justices would uphold a
race-conscious remedy. Such a strict
interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause may prove fatal to stratified juror selection techniques that take race
or ethnicity into account. These techniques are adopted not to remedy ongoing intentional discrimination in
the selection of jurors, but to restore
discrepancies between the demographics ofjury lists and the
demographics of local adult
populations, imbalances produced by race-neutral selection
methods and criteria.
Absent a more conclusive
pronouncement, however, it is
also reasonable to predict that
the Court may in the future accept as "compelling" other, forward-looking interests. For example, the Court has not
overruled a 1977 decision upholding the use of race as a factor in medical school admissions in order enhance the
academic and educational environment.24 Methods of selecting potential jurors for qualicited as the only example of a compel- fied lists and venires that use race or
ling interest the goal of correcting ethnicity may survive constitutional at"pervasive, systematic, and obstinate tack if the interest in promoting the legitimacy of jury verdicts provides an
discriminatory conduct, ' 23 suggesting
that ongoing, intentional discrimina- equally strong basis for upholding
race-based selection systems, and other
race-neutral options are not available
considerations, unless the state can show that its
25
use of race is necessary to achieve a compelling
for achieving the same goals.

ing this standard in the context of electoral districts, where, as in the jury selection context, federal law closely
regulating racial imbalance gives lawmakers an incentive to act affirmatively to secure racial balance.22
The Court also has yet to clarify
which interests could qualify as compelling enough to justify the consideration of race. In Adarand, the Court

state interest. Id. at 2481.
23. 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (describing the problem
addressed by the race-based remedy that was upheld in United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
(1987)).
24. IndeedJustice O'Connor's majority opinion
in Adarand cited Justice Powell's pivotal opinion in
that case favorably. But see Hopwood v. Texas, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 4719 (March 18, 1996) rejecting
diversity as a compelling interest in law school admissions, stating "Justice Powell's arguments in
Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never
represented the view of a majority of the Court").
25. See Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2118 (a racial classification cannot strvive strict scrutiny unless there
was first 'consideration of the use of race-neutral
means' to achieve the government's goal, quoting
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706, 729
(1989)).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Gometz, 730 F. 2d
475 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (refusing "to infer from
the provision empowering court clerks to follow up
on non-responders a legislative intent that the
power must be used to eliminate possible nonresponse bias" and quoting Senate Report No.
891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, U.S. Code Cong. &
does
Admin. News 1968 p. 1792 (1967) ("The act...
not require that at any stage beyond the initial
source list the selection process shall produce
groups that accurately mirror community makeup.")), cert. denied 469 U.S. 845 (1984).

Statutory challenges
Federal courts considering stratified
systems should also anticipate challenges under the Jury Selection and
Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1861-1868.
This statute requires federal jurors to
be "selected at random from a fair
cross section of the community in the
district or division wherein the court
convenes" and prohibits "exclu[sion]
from service...on account of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or
economic status." Courts have agreed
that the federal jury selection statute
does not mandate stratified selection
methods that could prevent imbal26
ances in qualified wheels and venires,
but they have yet to address whether it
bars such remedies.
The text of the act offers little guid-
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ance. On the one hand, the act nowhere defines what is meant by its
command that selection be "random." Indeed, it gives discretion to
jury clerks to compel people to respond to jury questionnaires when at
first they do not return them, allowing
for some manipulation of the qualified
list beyond whatever composition the
initial mailing produces."7 On the
other hand, it does not mention residential balancing when describing the
creation of lists of qualified
jurors or veniremembers,
nor does it mention racial
balancing for any list, even
though it expressly provides
that the master wheel reflect the residential demographics that appear in the
list of registered voters.
Stratifying jury lists, at
least by residence, does not
appear to violate the main
purpose of the Act, which
was not to require randomness in a statistical sense,
but only to prevent intentional
discrimination
against individuals or
groups. As one court explained, when a selection
technique "create [s] only a
slim chance that particular
jurors could be designated by the jury
clerk," it is sufficiently "random" under the Act.28
In dicta 20 years ago, the Tenth Circuit declined to condemn a system
that "oversampled" certain areas containing residents who tend to be disqualified and excused at higher rates
than others, noting that "the practical
effect of the alleged initial 'overrepresentation'...when considered in conjunction with the disproportionate
number of 'travel hardship' excuse requests from that division, was a 'qualified' jury wheel more accurately reflecting a 'fair cross section of the
community' than would have been obtained had every seventy-fifth name
from each division been selected.

' 29

The act may erect even greater
hurdles for race- or ethnicity-based selection systems. If the reduced rate at
which non-minority citizens are summoned for jury service under racially
stratified systems can be considered
278
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"exclusion" from jury service, or if a
court concludes that any consideration of race or ethnicity conflicts with
the anti-discrimination norm of the
act, a statutory challenge to a raciallystratified system could succeed. Needless to say, both of the federal courts
that have specifically attended to racial
balance in their qualification procedures-the Eastern District of Michigan and the District of Connecticutconsider their methods well within

overtly recognizes race or ethnicity as a
factor in jury selection may offend
those legislators or constituents who
would prefer to adhere to a color-blind
selection system.

As vicinage-wide reforms continue
to fail to yield demographically representative venires, judges, lawmakers,
and administrators are searching for
other solutions that will. Striking particularly unrepresentative
venires ("venire shopping") or calling in huge
numbers of jurors for isolated
racially-sensitive
cases, 30 are responses that

those authorized by the act.
Because many state courts are bound
by state statutes that resemble the federal act, stratified selection in state systems may face similar arguments. State
courts interested in adopting stratified
selection techniques may choose to bypass or eliminate such statutory challenges by amending state law to accommodate stratified selection. This
legislative route has its own share of
hazards, of course. A statute that
27. 28 U.S.C. §1964(a). Follow up procedures
can have a significant effect on minority representation in venires. In Madison, Wisconsin, state
court follow-up letters to jurors who do not return
their questionnaires have raised the return rate
from African Americans from 31 to 42 percent, although the rate for whites is nearly double that at
83 percent. Schneider, New Rules to Expand Jury
Picks, Capital Times (Madison), Nov. 15, 1994, at
IA.
28. United States v. Bearden, 659 F.2d 590, 603
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 456 U.S. 936 (1982). See
also United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1213
(11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 1099 (1992).
29. United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 584 n.4
(10th Cir. 1976).
30. SeeJURORs: TrE POWER OF TWEi.vE, REPORT OF
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may appease particular litigants, but may in the long
run prove to be arbitrary
and expensive to administer, or harmful to other litigants. A statistically-sound
stratified selection system
can provide proportionate
residential, racial, or ethnic representation in most
or all venires, not just in
isolated cases. However, jurisdictions considering
stratified selection methods should tread carefully,
as the rulings of courts on
this delicate and complex topic are difficult to predict. V1

THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT CoMMrrrEE ON MORE ErFECTIVE USE OF JURIES 44-45 (Sept. 1994) (recom-

mending that judges make more use of their power
to strike grossly underrepresentative jury panels);
Ackerman, Second jury picked for homicide trial; First

juy dismissed becausepoolfailed to include blacks, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Jan. 11, 1995, at BI; Youth
Guilty in the Killingof 2 Gay Men, N.Y. Times, Feb 10,
1995, at A25 (reporting that defendant's first trial
was canceled because the 70-member jury pool
lacked enough black members); Torrance, Jury
makeup among issues raised by Chapel defense; Small
percentage of adults listed in county's pool, Atlanta J.
3
and Const., Aug. 4, 1995, at J (noting judge denied motion for changed jury selection method
"but did allow them to call 400 prospective jurors-double the number usually summoned").

Drugs-Of-Abuse Testing

Continuing a
tradition of success
in drug court.

Syva's support for drug courts dates back to the
beginning of this innovative partnership of judges,
criminal justice, and treatment providers. On-site
urine testing, based on Emit® drugs-of-abuse
assays, is integral to their success inrehabilitating
defendants and streamlining the judicial process.
Emit assays have been validated in dozens
of court decisions, all the way up to the Supreme
Court. Their accuracy and reliability are documented in close to 200 published papers. Syva's
Substance Abuse Specialist team brings over
25 years of experience to help you design and
implement programs to meet your needs.

Succeed with Syva. For a free copy of the
special issue of the Syva Link on drug courts,
or for help in implementing or updating your
urine testing program, give us a call.
1-800-227-9948.
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